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THE THREE Cs VERSUS THE DINOSAUR:
UPDATING THE TECHNOLOGICALLY
ARCHAIC FDCPA TO PROVIDE
CONSUMERS, COLLECTORS, AND COURTS
CLARITY
MELISSA TRAvIS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Creditors have better memory than debtors," Benjamin
Franklin once famously quipped.' Perhaps, however, his words
could be updated to suit today's reality rather than his own simple
time: "Creditors will go to great lengths for a return of their
money, soliciting the help of third party debt collectors who often
resort to unsavory collection tactics, having no incentive to
maintain good standing with debtor-consumers." 2 Or even:
* J.D./LL.M Employee Benefits Law Candidate, May 2011, The John
Marshall Law School. The author wishes to thank her family and friends for
their love and support, Justin C. Hagan and Reilly C. Travis for their patience
and companionship, and the John Marshall Law Review for assisting the
author in readying this Comment for publication. The author also wishes to
thank her former and forever beloved boss Astor Blake who serves as the
author's inspiration for this Comment. Finally, the author wishes to dedicate
this Comment to her Grandpa Buddy whose love for learning and writing
about God's law inspired the author's passion for man's law.
1. See generally BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK (1736),

available at http://www.vlib.us/amdoes/texts/prichard36.html (providing a list
of Franklin's famous maxims while using the pseudonym Richard Saunders).
Franklin's Almanack contained the types of material commonly found in an
almanac-calendars, weather forecasts, common household tips, and puzzlesbut his version also included maxims, such as the one cited, that counseled
readers on thrift and courtesy with a bit of healthy cynicism. Id.; see also
Franklin Publishes "Poor Richard" Almanac on Frugality, Cynicism, THE
OAKLAND PRESS (July 04, 2010), http://www.theoaklandpress.comlarticles/
(noting
that
these
2010/07/04/opinion/doc4c2d3bfl8c7b9928962008.txt
aphorisms were a reflection of the norms and social mores of Franklin's time).
2. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) defines a creditor as a
"person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed,
but ... does not include any person to the extent that he receives an
assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating
collection of such debt for another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (2006). See also S.
REP. No. 95-382, at 2, (1977), reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696 (presenting
testimony that because independent collectors often work on a 50-percent
commission and are likely to have no future contact with the consumer, they
have more incentive to resort to unsavory tactics and are unconcerned with
1033
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"Creditors, upon realization they are not going to get the desired
return of their money will, without reservation, sell charged-off
debts to debt purchasers for pennies on the dollar, which
ultimately results in debtor-consumers receiving communications
regarding their debts from parties to which they never agreed to
do business."3 These lengthy creditor proverbs might demonstrate
why Mr. Franklin was a fan of brevity in his writings, but more
importantly they showcase the current state of consumer-creditor
relationships in a society that has, for many years, lived through
the aid of credit card debt. 4
Even though Congress created the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act ("FDCPA") in response to such harassing tactics,
FDCPA law today is a maze of definitions and provisions that are
both vague and outdated.5 With the wave of financial reform and
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"), 6 specifically the provisions that
the consumer's opinion of them). For a brief overview of Congressional
findings on the effects of these abusive tactics on consumers, including
creating issues of marital instability as well as contributing to job loss, see 15
U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2006).
3. Debt buyers are those, often a company, collection law firm, and
contingency collection agency, who purchase delinquent or charged-off debts
from a creditor for a fraction of the value of the debt. THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (F.T.C), COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
CHANGE 4 (2009) [hereinafter "F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS"],
available
at
http://www.ftc.govfbcp/workshops/debtcollection/dewr.pdf.
Commonly, purchased debt is purchased in portfolios for "pennies on the
dollar" from either the original creditor or from the debt purchaser who most
recently owned right to collect on the debt. See Sam Glover, Poverty Law: Has
the Flood of Debt Collection Lawsuits Swept away Minnesotan's Due Process
Rights?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2009) (noting that these are
debts purchased for such a low price because the portfolios often lack the
proper validation documentation to adequately serve as admissible evidence in
a lawsuit).
4. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 12-13 &
n.72 (2009) (providing updated data from January 2009 for consumer
delinquency and noting that there has been a 40-percent increase in defaults
from December 2007 to 2008 due to the economic downturn). According to the
report, which gathered statistics from 2007, "[rlevolving consumer debt (which
includes mostly credit card debt) increased .. . 5%" over a decade and that as
of June 2007, American consumers held, on average, $3,000 in credit card
debt. Id. at 11-12.
5. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 16921692p (2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/
credit/cre27.pdf (providing comprehensive list of federally mandated standards
for debt collection practices); see, e.g., FTC Urges Reform of Debt Collection
Laws,
THE
DALY
FIN.
GROUP
(March
3,
2009),
http://www.dalyfinancial.com/news.html (explaining the need for FDCPA
reform and referencing statistics that the FTC received nearly 80,000
complaints in 2008 against third-party debt collectors).
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); The Consumer Financial Protection Act of
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authorize the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau ("CFPB"), comes an opportunity for FDCPA clarity.7
Although many provisions of the FDCPA are in need of
clarification, this Comment will focus on the problems that
advancements in technology have caused with the FDCPA's
antiquated language. 8 The CFPB will have the unique opportunity
to "fix" substantive provisions of the technologically out-of-touch
FDCPA and can do so in a manner that makes it less confusing for
the three Cs-the consumers, the collectors, and the courts.9
In Part II of this Comment, both the CFPB and the FDCPA
will be explained, from their creation to the problems currently
facing the outdated consumer protection statute. Part III will
address the problem of what constitutes a communication in the
FDCPA and will examine the conflict as it has arisen in the courts.
Finally, Part IV will propose ways in which the CFPB can combat
the problems associated with the outdated FDCPA and how such
enforcements can clarify debt collection law for the three Cs.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct

A fallen financial market that has been compared to the likes
of that which spurred the financial regulations of the Great
Depression'o serves as the backdrop to Dodd-Frank and its
intended financial systems overhaul." Dodd-Frank serves to
overhaul the consumer financial institutions throughout the
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Tit. X, § 1001-1100 124 Stat. 1376, 580-731 (2010).
7. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 69-70
(requesting rule-making authority in order to effectively respond to FDCPA
concerns).
8. The term consumer refers to an "individual or an agent, trustee, or
representative acting on behalf of an individual." 12 U.S.C.S. § 5481(1) (2010);
see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (providing the FDCPA definition of a consumer).
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See generally Robert Hockett, The Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1213 (2010) (providing scholarly analysis as to factors leading to the
late 2000s economic recession). Hockett focuses mainly on the mortgage crisis
that helped lead to current financial troubles, noting that the economic failure
can be attributed to a "recent departure from the originally bipartisan package
of mutually reinforcing mortgage and finance-regulatory innovations." Id. at
1213.
11. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Regulation and the Recession: Causes, Effects,
and Solutions for Financial Crisis:After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L. REV. 393,
397-98 (2010) (pointing to the scandals of corporate America and the laws that
Congress tried to pass to combat the failures that led to "economic calamity").
See also Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial
Landscape, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 9, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100
01424052748704682604575369030061839958.html (calling the Dodd-Frank
Bill the biggest expansion of government power over the banking markets
since the Great Depression).
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country. 12 This all-encompassing law also produces an increase in
consumer financial protection through Article X: the Consumer
Financial Protection Act. 13 This Act authorizes the creation of the
CFPB and provides it with the power to regulate, interpret and
create law regarding consumer financial protection.1 4 This
authority includes interpreting and clarifying the FDCPA.15 The
need for consumer financial reform motivated the drafters of
Dodd-Frank to include Article X into the Act. 16 This section of
Dodd-Frank serves to "implement and, where applicable, enforce
Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer
financial products and services and that markets for consumer
12. See supra note 10, 11 and accompanying text (providing greater depth
to the cause of the most recent economic recession as well as a look into the
state of the economy after the downturn).
13. See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481 (LexisNexis 2010) (enforcing both the
creation of the CFPB as well as a time table for the gradual transfer of
authority from federal agencies previously holding enforcement power over
consumer financial protection areas to the CFPB). For a look at other areas of
consumer financial protection not covered in this comment, see Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Tit.
XIV, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
14. See Venable CFPB Watch: Introducing the New Sheriff in Town,
VENABLE LLP (July 2010), http://www.venable.com/files/Publication/2a3969eaeff7-4874-a4db-049824b607a0/PreviewlPublicationAttachment/922a420d-Of8545bf-ac62-4b88f79c38blVenable CFPBWatch--July-2010.pdf (providing an
initial overview of the CFPB-how it will be structured, what authority it will
have, and who is implicated in its coverage). The Consumer Financial
Protection Act also includes an implementation timeline and guidelines. Id.
July 21, 2011 served as the transfer date, when agencies in control of
consumer financial systems transferred their authority to the CFPB, in the
Act. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection: Designated Transfer Date
Notice
75 Fed. Reg. 57, 252 (Sep. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-09-20/pdfl2010-23487.pdf. The CFPB
website is now up and running, so for more information pertaining to the
Bureau's role and goals pertaining to consumer financial protection, see CFPB,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
15. The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Tit. X, § 1001-1100,
124 Stat. at 580-731.
16. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial ProtectionAgency, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH (2009), http://www.aei.org/d
ocLiblLevitin%20-%2oConsumer%20Financial%2OProtection%20Agency.pdf
(arguing that due to consumer financial protection spread among ten agencies
with differing levels of authority demonstrates one of the reasons that
consumer financial protection is in need of reform - for uniformity). Cf. F.T.C.,
COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at i (calling for FDCPA reform
due to its inability to address consumer protection issues). The FTC
expressing a need for power to reform the FDCPA demonstrates that these
agencies with authority over consumer financial areas of the law are in need of
reform themselves. Id. at viii-ix. As a result, merging these different areas of
consumer financial protection law under the helm of one agency would allow
for the unification necessary to facilitate consumer financial reform. Levitin at
*1.
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B. ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau - the CFPB
The general structure of the CFPB is explained in DoddFrank.' 8 The CFPB is funded by the Federal Reserve, but not
controlled by it.'9 Additionally, in July 2011, the CFPB took over
regulatory authority for all consumer financial protection issues
currently spanned across the ten agencies and twelve different
consumer protection statutes. 20 For example, the CFPB plans to
take over the FTC's regulation of the FDCPA.21 While the FTC has
had no rule-making authority in overseeing the FDCPA, the CFPB
will "have authority to issue rules, and issue orders and guidance
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of Federal
consumer financial laws." 22
17. See Tomino Narita, An Overview of the Consumer FinancialProtection
Act of 2010 for Debt Collection, FDCPA DEFENSE BLOG (July 23, 2010),
http://www.fdcpadefense.blogspot.com/2010/07/overview-of-consumer-financi
al.html (explaining specifically how this provision of Dodd-Frank and the
resulting CFPB will affect the area of debt collection).
18. Pub. L. No. 111-203, Tit. X, § 1011-18, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Various
law firms have provided overviews of the Consumer Financial Protection Act.
For a basic look at the Act's structure and capabilities, see Financial
Regulatory Reforms Update: Title X - Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (June 30, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/files/
News/9daacd6d-9deb-446a-b4da-57b966l0f49a/Presentation/NewsAttachment
/fl8ba912-4786-4636-b2c6-72cba80d777e/FRR_063010 TitlelO.pdf.; See also
supra note 14 (providing a vision of the CFPB from another authority).
19. SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, supra note 18, at 1.
20. Member Alert - Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), DBA
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.dbainternational.org/eblast/cfpa.asp (last visited
Aug. 1, 2011). Levitin, supra note 16, at 1 (proposing that CFPB will gain all
regulatory and rulemaking power that is spread across the ten agencies
currently overseeing consumer financial protection). Although he later points
to concerns many fear would be brought by the creation of the CFPA - increase
in costs of financial products if overregulation occurs and as well as a possible
burden on new innovation in the financial industry - Levitin concludes that
these issues are separate from the one at issue in consolidating control of the
consumer protection statutes under one agency roof. Id. at 15.
21. See Tomino Narita, An Overview of the Consumer Financial Protection
Act of 2010 for Debt Collection, FDCPA DEFENSE BLOG (July 23, 2010),
http://www.fdcpadefense.blogspot.com/2010/07/overview-of-consumerfinancial.html (explaining how this provision of Dodd-Frank and the resulting
CFPB will affect the area of debt collection).
22. Title X Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,AMERICAN BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.aba.com/RegReform/RR10_3.htm (last visited Aug.
1, 2011). Interestingly enough, the FTC asked for this same kind of rulemaking authority in past reports. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS,
supra note 3, at vi-ix, (noting that thirty years after its codification, the
FDCPA is outdated; as a result, the FTC urged Congress to give them the
authority to create rules to address the current FDCPA problems and to
combat new issues as they arise). Cf. F.T.C., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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C. FairDebt Collection ProtectionAct - The FDCPA
The FDCPA is a powerful federal statute that regulates the
debt collection industry. 23 In 1978, the FDCPA was created in
order to protect consumers from harassment and abuse directed at
them by debt collectors. 24 The FDCPA drafters intended to
increase consumer protection while maintaining the policy that
the collection of valid debts was economically important to
society. 25
Essentially, the statute aimed to provide consumers and the
debt collection industry with clear-cut regulations defining
consumer rights and outlining permissible collection practices. 26 In
an attempt to provide clarification regarding the FDCPA's scope,
the drafters included a list of definitions essential to both those
inside and outside the debt collection industry, such as
"consumer," "creditor," "debt," and "debt collector." 27
ANNUAL REPORT 2011: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 19 (2011),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110321fairdebtcollectreport.pdf

(acknowledging the creation of the CFPB and its rule-making authority that
ultimately renders any of the FTC's previous requests for regulatory authority
now moot).
23. See generally FDCPA, 15 U.S.C §§ 1692-1692p (2006) (providing
regulations to promote consumer protection and increase uniformity in the
debt collection industry).
24. See 15 U.S.C § 1692(a) (2006) (detailing Congress' finding: "abundant
evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices
by many debt collectors . .. [that have] contribute[d] to the number of personal
bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of
individual privacy."). For additional Congressional findings regarding the debt
collection industry, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)-(d). See also S. REP. No. 95-382, at
2, (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696 (referring to the findings of
abuse in the debt collection industry).
25. "The Commission recognizes that the timely payment of debts is
important to creditors and that the debt collection industry offers useful
assistance toward that end." F.T.C., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANNUAL
REPORT 2005: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 1 (2005), available at
http://www,ftc.gov/os/2006/04/PO648042006FDCPAReport.pdf.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006) (noting that "[i]t is the purpose of this
title to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses"). Some provisions
of the FDCPA demonstrate this creation of boundaries quite clearly. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f(1)-(8) (2006). For example, according to the Unfair Practices section of
the statute, "a debt collector cannot use unfair or unconscionable means to
collect or attempt to collect any debt." Id. The section proceeds to list conduct
that is a violation and includes such tactics as depositing or threatening to
deposit a postdated check and communicating with a consumer regarding a
debt by a post card. Id. § 1692f(4), (7). The specific acts listed demonstrate
areas in which the statute has created clear-cut lines by which the three Cs all
know what can and cannot be done. Id. § 1692f(1)-(8).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)-(6) (2006). The term "consumer" means "any
natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." Id.
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In addition to defining these basic terms of the debt collection
process, the FDCPA also defines a communication between a
collector and a consumer as "the conveying of information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium." 28 This definition provides for how a debt collector may
communicate with third parties for the purpose of acquiring a
consumer's location information, but restricts a debt collector's
communication with third parties to only instances of obtaining
that location information.2 9 Furthermore, of particular importance
to this Comment, the FDCPA provides that every time a debt
collector tries to communicate with a consumer, he has a duty to
disclose that he is a debt collector attempting to collect a debt.3 0
§ 1692a(3). The term "creditor" means "any person who offers or extends credit
creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but ... not ... any person to the
extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for
the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another." Id. § 1692a(4).
The term "debt" means "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to
pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has
been reduced to judgment." Id. § 1692a(5). The term "debt collector" means
"any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails
in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed
or due or asserted to be owed or due another." Id. § 1692a(6). For a more
definitive explanation of what a debt collector is, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)(F) (2006).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2006). For a review of more definitions provided
under the FDCPA, see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2006) (explaining that any additional contact
with third parties regarding collection of the debt may only be permissible
with the consumer's written consent or the permission from a competent
jurisdiction). Furthermore, even though a collector may call third parties to
gather location information, if this information has already been gathered or
the collector has already spoken with the third party on a previous occasion,
subsequent communications may only be made upon the third party's request
or if the collector reasonably believes the previous response to questions were
erroneous or incomplete. Id. § 1692b(2). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006)
(providing a list of the only third parties a debt collector is allowed to
communicate with in connection with the collection of any debt other than the
consumer: "his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted
by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt
collector.").
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006) (hereinafter "mini-Miranda"). An
interesting problem resulting from the requirement of the mini-Miranda
occurs with mortgage servicers, who are considered debt collectors because the
mortgage is in default. Due to the blunt language of a mini-Miranda and the
requirement that it be spoken with every communication, its utterance can
actually mislead delinquent borrowers into thinking that the contact is "just
another debt collector" instead of a phone call about an active, non-defaulted,
yet delinquent mortgage. MORTGAGE BANKERS Assoc. ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING SERVICING OF MORTGAGE DEBT AND THE

FAIR

DEBT

COLLECTION

PRACTICES

2-3

(June

2007),

available at
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This disclosure requirement is known throughout the industry as
a mini-Miranda. 31
Despite the drafters' attempt to create a debt collection
statute that defines and regulates each aspect of the industry for
the benefit of the three Cs, 32 time and technology have complicated
what the FDCPA term communication33 means today.34 The main
problem with the FDCPA is its failure to predict and account for
the introduction of new communication technologies. 35 Because
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtcollectionworkshop/529233-00023.pdf. For
a look at the mini-Miranda in the context of Florida consumer protection law,
see generally Shera Erskine, Note, Please Leave a Message After the Tone:
How Florida Lawyers Should Approach the "Mini-Miranda" Warning
Requirement of the Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct, 32 NOVA L. REV. 245
(2007). The author explains that the Florida Consumer Collection Practices
Act (FCCPA) only requires a debt collector to provide the mini-Miranda when
requested by the consumer. Id. at 259. She further argues that collectors in
Florida should adhere to the FCCPA disclosure requirement because it
provides consumers more protection in the areas of tort privacy laws. Id. at
268. This argument fails to consider that allowing collectors leeway with full
disclosure disadvantages the least sophisticated consumer who does not know
that he needs to request this disclosure to find out the purpose of the
communication. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2006) (providing the list of false and
misleading representations that have created this least sophisticated
consumer notion).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006).
32. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at iii-iv
(proposing extensive transformations in FDCPA law to meet with the
dramatic changes in the debt collection industry since 1977). The FTC points
out that multiple changes-from inflation to the increase in third-party
collections and debt purchasing, to the invention of new technologies that
make the industry able to work large volumes of debt quickly and
inexpensively-demonstrate that FDCPA created for the 1977 debt collection
industry is not nearly as effective against today's industry. Id. at iv-v.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2006) (providing the definition of
communication according to the FDCPA). This simplistic definition of
communication has caused problems previously for the FDCPA including the
issue of whether the initiation of a lawsuit through summons is considered an
initial communication. Compare Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding the initiation was an initial communication that required
proper disclosure), and Thomas v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d
914, 920 (7th Cir. 2004) (providing a broad interpretation of the statute to hold
that service of summons and complaint was an "initial communication"), with
Vega v. McKay, 351 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that legal action
did not constitute an "initial communication" because the FTC had excluded
legal pleadings as a communication).
34. In thirty years, aspects of the industry have changed. F.T.C.,
COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at iii-iv. Now each collector has
access to a personal computer with the ability to mass-produce and send
letters to debtors. Id. at 19. Each collector has access to sophisticated
automated dialer systems with interactive voice recording technology to place
telephone calls to consumers. Id. at 16.
35. Consumers also have access to new technologies, including mobile
phones, caller ID, email, text messaging, and social networking sites. Id. at 17.
The FTC generally believes that such new innovations should be able to be
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communications technology has advanced considerably since 1978,
the FDCPA shows its age through its failure to account for and
accept such advancements.3 6
For example, some confusion has arisen regarding the use of
answering machines in the debt collection process. Although
answering machines did not become popular with consumers until
the 1980s, the product had been commercially sold in the U.S.
since the early 1970s. 37 The FDCPA failed, however, to
contemplate their use in the context of collector communications.38
The drafters only defined that a communication could be achieved
"orally" or "in writing."39 Consequently, new technologies have
created interpretive difficulties for the three Cs with respect to
proper debt collection disclosure practices. 40
For debt collectors, this difficulty with leaving voice messages
is compounded due to a risk of FDCPA liability even when
complying with the statute as enacted. For example, if a message
used in the collection of a debt, but without rule-making authority, the FDCPA
remains dated. Id. at 50.
36. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at vi-vii
(finding that FDCPA is in need of modernization). The FTC's
recommendations for FDCPA reform garnered attention from the United
States Government Accountability Office, which recommended both that the
FTC should be given rule-making authority and that, with that authority, it
should update the statute to reflect the current and future technology the
statute failed to foresee when it was enacted in 1977. See U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-748, CREDIT CARDS: FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD BETTER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT
COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY 51 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09748.pdf (finding, additionally, that with
increased debt purchaser business, FDCPA modification should focus on
ensuring better maintenance of credit account documentation for collectors
and buyers).
37. History: The History of Answering Machines, FCC, http://www.fec.gov/c
gb/kidszone/history.ans machine.html (last updated June 24, 2004). Another
example of the dramatic technological advances can be seen through the use of
personal computers (PCs). See, e.g., The National Academy of Engineering,
Computers, http://www.greatachievements.org (last visited Aug. 1, 2011)
(providing a basic history of computers in society, including the invention and
commercialization of PCs). The Apple II, the accessible home computer, was
not introduced on the market until 1977; the wave of other PCs did not hit the
market until the early 1980s. Id.
38. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 15 & n.109
(demonstrating that answering machine technology had not been considered
in the drafting of the FDCPA).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006).
40. The drafters of the FDCPA could not have reasonably foreseen debt
collection industries of today involving personal computers, online collection
data storage sites and, in some instances, in-house tech departments to help
with the implementation of sophisticated collections software. F.T.C.,
COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 15-17. For a look at the
FDCPA third-party communications and disclosure provisions, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692b-c, e (2006).
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is left including a proper mini-Miranda, the debt collector leaves
open the possibility of a FDCPA violation if someone other than
the original message recipient overhears the communication.4 1 If
the debt collector leaves a simple message (perhaps "This is
Johnny, please call me back about this important matter at. . . ."),
he may have violated the FDCPA for not leaving a mini-Miranda. 42
This communications issue has created much confusion resulting
in a split among the district courts. 43
Further, based upon the consideration that communication
under the FDCPA can be through "any medium," the question
arises whether the drafters of the FDCPA intended for collectors to
be able to use newer avenues of communication. 44 In addition to
problems surrounding the use of voice messages in attempts to
contact consumers, new mediums such as social networking
websites create a unique opportunity for collectors to acquire a
consumer's location information 45 in order to facilitate the debt
collection process. 46 Because these new technologies lack
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006); see supra text accompanying note 30
(referring to § 1692e(1 1) as the common industry term "mini-Miranda").
42. See Tomio Narita, Leaving Voice Messages - Ninth Circuit May Resolve
the Foti issue, FDCPA DEFENSE BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010), http://fdcpadefen
(discussing
se.blogspot.com/2010/08/leaving-voicemail-messages-ninth.html
how the debt collector defendant in Koby v. ARS National Service, Inc., is
appealing the Southern District of California's decision that the brief voice
message left by the collector could be deemed a violation of § 1692e(11) as a
failure to disclose yet not a communication in compliance with § 1692a(2));
Koby v. ARS Nat. Services, Inc., CIV. 09CV0780, 2010 WL 1438763, at *7
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010).
43. For examples of case law holding that a brief voice message is not a
communication, see Koby, 2010 WL 1438763 at *2-6; e.g, Biggs v. Credit
Collections, Inc., CIV-07-0053-F, 2007 WL 4034997, *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15,
2007) (holding that due to the narrowness of the statutory language, the court
could not read into the language that a message that conveyed "no information
regarding a debt" was a communication); but see Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the a broad
interpretation of FDCPA communication includes conveying information of
some kind and that a simple voice message from the debt collector fit that
definition). The court also noted that a voice message without disclosure puts
too much burden on the least sophisticated consumer to recall the first
communication. Id. at 668-70.
44. Even though the original intent of the drafters is an interesting
consideration, the FTC has taken a proactive approach in their last report and
stated that the FDCPA should be adapted to use this communication. F.T.C.,
COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at vi, 14-20.
45. Location information means the consumer's place of abode and the
accompanying telephone or his place of employment. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(7)
(2006). For a consideration of the use of social networking sites to gather
location information, see infra IV.B.la-b.
46. For conflicting views on the use of social networking sites to locate and
contact consumers, compare Vanessa Romo, Elusive Debtors Foiled by Their
Social Media Sites, NPR (July 12, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/s
tory/story.php?storyld=128464415&ps-cprs, with Gary Nitzkin, Who Looks
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regulation or definition within the FDCPA, the three Cs have been
left with no guidelines as how to address their use.4 7 As it stands,
the FDCPA causes great difficulty for the consumer trying to
understand the law, the collector trying to abide by the law, and
the courts trying to interpret the law.
The steep rise in FDCPA complaints against debt collection
agencies in recent years signals the need for clarity for the three
Cs. Further, the FTC has acknowledged that the statute is no
longer serving its purpose of combating abusive collections tactics
given the technological advancement of recent times. 48 More
importantly, existing case law evidences many courts' confusion
over FDCPA issues, like that of communication. A lack of
confidence in the FTC and no clear guidance from the courts
demonstrates a need for statutory reformation. 49
As of July 2011, both the regulatory power and rulemaking
authority the FTC lacked while overseeing the FDCPA has since
been transferred to the CFPB.50 Uniformity is sorely needed in a
world where consumers often work with out-of-state financial
institutions, collectors often try to collect out-of-state debts, and
the courts are left to sort it all out. In order to facilitate greater
consumer protection, the CFPB must utilize its rule-making
authority over the outdated FDCPA; otherwise, uniformity will
remain quixotic and the CFPB's ability to be an effective consumer
advocate questionable.
III.

ARGUMENT

Although communications technology has advanced greatly
since the FDCPA's implementation thirty years ago, the FTC lacks
rule-making authority to address these innovations.5 ' Because the
FDCPA remains silent regarding technological tools invaluable to
consumers, collectors, and the courts,52 the three Cs lack the
Silly Now, NPR?, MICH. COLLECTION L. BLOG (July 22, 2010),
http://www.michigancollectionlawblog.com/?p=148 (providing case law to
argue that using social networking sites to 'friend' consumers is not actionable
under FDCPA).
47. F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at vi-vii.
48. Id. at 14-20.
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (providing a list of cases that
demonstrate the conflict among courts in deciphering simplistic language of
communication skewed by the introduction of technology in the FDCPA).
50. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at vi-viii
(noting the lack of authority).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 16921(d) (2006) (expressing that no commission or
agency referred to in the FDCPA has regulation or rule-making authority over
debt collection practices as defined in the statute). See, F.T.C., COLLECTING
CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at viii (exhibiting the FTC's knowledge that
it cannot effectively enforce debt collection law without this rule-making
authority).
52. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 21
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necessary guidance to adhere to, understand, and analyze the
statute's communications provisions. First, this section addresses
the paradox collectors face by leaving voice messages for
consumers. 53 Second, this argument examines cases that consider
the FDCPA voice message issue. Finally, it presents arguments for
and against the use of social networking sites in debt collection
practices.54
A. Technology, Communications,and the Three Cs
In our technological society, consumers anxiously await new
products to better connect them to the world around them. 55 Debt
collectors and courts also utilize technology to realize efficiency
and cost advantages in their businesses.56 A central problem for
courts evaluating these communications in the FDCPA context is
striking a balance between perpetuating the policy of protecting
consumers from abusive collection practices while acknowledging
57
collectors' rights to use these tools to collect valid debts.

(concluding that modernization of debt collection law is necessary to take
account of today's new communication technologies). By having the advantage
of websites like Pacer, Westlaw, and LexisNexis to provide comprehensive
databases of information, courts have also been able to embrace the use of new
technology; specifically, courts' acceptance of new technology can be seen
through acceptance of e-discovery submissions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 2006. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, & 45
(providing examples of how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure accept and
address the use of electronic discoverable materials); K&L Gates LLP, EDiscovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Go Into Effect
Today, ELECTRONIC DISCOvERY LAw (Dec. 1, 2006), http://www.ediscovery
law.com/2006/12/articles/news-updates/ediscovery-amendments-to-the-federalrules-of-civil-procedure-go-into-effect-today (providing a summary of each
update to the FRCP that addresses e-discovery).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2006) (providing meaningful disclosure
regulations for initial and subsequent communications); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692c(b) (2006) (providing that without prior written consent, a debt
collector may not communicate with a third party in the connection with the
collections of a debt).
54. See generally Romo, supra note 44; Nitzkin, supra note 44 (showcasing
the opposing argument to the NPR article covering debt collection and social
networking sites).
55. The FTC Report acknowledges that consumers use many of these
technologies in daily activities, including answering machines, caller ID, cell
phones, email, and Internet. F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra
note 3, at 15.
56. See id. at iv-v (providing that technology has increased the ability for
debt collectors to mass produce and send letters, use automated dialer
services, store data, and increase the payment options by which consumers
can repay a debt). The FTC points out that technological innovations have
helped facilitate the creation of both large, full service debt collections
operations as well as thriving niche collection operations. Id. at 14-15.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006).
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Voice Message Paradox

The FDCPA does not advise the three Cs on whether a
collector's voice message may be left on a consumer's answering
machine.58 As the statute stands, debt collectors can incur liability
by leaving a voice message under two separate scenarios: thirdparty disclosure59 and detailed disclosure.6 0 Although the
technology has been used for decades,61 because the FTC cannot
create FDCPA rules, the question remains: Can a collector leave a
voice message for a consumer without violating the FDCPA?
a. Disclosure of Information to Third Parties
To comply with § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA, a collector cannot
communicate with third parties absent the consumer's
permission. 62 When leaving voice messages, there exists the
possibility that someone else is present when the message is left or
when the consumer listens to it. If a third party overhears the
communication, the collector faces FDCPA sanctions.63 Many
collectors have tried to avoid this liability by leaving brief
messages, divulging little information outside a call-back phone
number. 64
For example, a collector may say: "Hi, this message is for Bob
Brown. This is Ms. Black. Please call me at 555-5555 regarding an
important matter." Some agencies may include the collection
account's reference number;6 5 others, as suggested in the example
58. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3 at 47
(providing analysis of the importance of answering machines in debt collection
industry).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006).
60. Id. § 1692e(11).
61. FCC, supra note 36.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2006) (including that, under this provision,
permission to communicate with third parties may also be authorized through
a judicial decision). Courts may expressly grant this permission for a collector
to communicate with a third party if they have competent jurisdiction and
may also do so to promote post judgment remedies. Id. § 1692c(b).
63. Id. § 1692c(b).
64. See, e.g, Koby, 2010 WL 1438763 at *3 (leaving a message that simply
stated: "This is Brian Cooper ... for Mike Simmons, I need you to return this
call as soon as you get this message 877-333-3880. . . ."). The collector in Biggs
v. Credit Collections, Inc., also survived FDCPA sanctions on the
communications issue by leaving a brief message. 2007 WL 4034997 at *4. The
court refused to read the language of the FDCPA liberally to include a voice
message that did not include words that would implicate the statutory
definition of communication. Id. Interestingly the court does note that if the
FDCPA language instead read to include "a communication in furtherance of
any attempt to collect a debt," the voice message would have been implicated
under the FDCPA. Id. For further analysis of the FDCPA and communications
problems see Elwin Griffith, The Role of Validationand Communication in the
Debt CollectionProcess, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 452-57 (2010).
65. See, e.g., Inman v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 08-5866, 2009 WL
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above, merely provide a name and call-back number. Collectors
contend that the uninformative messages are not communications
because under the FDCPA, a communication must "convey[
information regarding a debt."66
b. Improper Disclosure of Debt Collection Intentions
Debt collectors also face a problem with respect to leaving
voice messages on answering machines pursuant to § 1692e(11). 6 7
Failing to provide meaningful disclosure, known as a miniMiranda,6 8 leaves collectors open to liability for FDCPA
violations. 69 The most common way collectors attempt to avoid
liability under this provision is by stating something like the
following: "This message is for Greg. If this is not Greg, please stop
listening now." After a thirty second pause, the collector says, "by
continuing to listen, you agree that you are Greg, the proper
3415281 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2009) (providing an example of a message left
by a debt collector that includes a reference number). "This message is forThomas Inman. Please call us back today at toll-free number, 1-800-350-2457.
When calling back, the Reference ID is EL9170 ... Thank you. Goodbye." Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2006).
67. Id. § 1692e(11).
68. See generally A Debtor's Rights Primer: "The Mini-Miranda" Warning,
PENN LAWYER.COM (July 24, 2010), http://www.pennlawyer.com/fdcpa.pdf
(discussing mini-Miranda requirements for debt collectors for both telephonic
and written communications). Interestingly, sometimes the use of a miniMiranda cannot save a collector from FDCPA liability if a court determines its
use to be insufficient. See Tomino Narita, Lesher and "Legal Capacity" - the
Third Circuit Grafts a New Concept into the FDCPA with Lesher v. Mitchell N.
Kay, FDCPA DEFENSE BLOG (July 3, 2011) http://fdcpadefense.blogspot.co
(discussing a 3rd
m/2011/07/lesher-and-legal-capacity-third-circuit.html
Circuit case where the court determined that settlement letters sent to
consumers that were written on a firm's letterhead with the mini-Miranda
provided on the back-a procedure commonly accepted throughout the
industry-were false and misleading because they "raise[d] the specter of
potential legal action") (quoting Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, 2011
WL 2450964, *9 (3d Cir. June 21, 2011)). This issue demonstrates how even
standard industry practice presented through a universally accepted
communications medium can fall victim to a court's struggle to apply the
FDCPA's antiquated language.
69. See 15 U.S.C § 1692k(2)(A) (2006) (providing that debt collectors who
fail to comply with any provisions of this title, with respect to an individual,
will result in a court-imposed fine of no more than $1,000 beyond actual
damages awarded). The amount of this sanction also serves as another
interesting problem that the FTC proposes should be reconsidered through a
FDCPA revamp. F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 6667. Many debt collectors who take an aggressive approach will risk the small
monetary sanction for the reward of potentially coercing people to pay their
debts. Id. The 2009 Report continues by noting that $1,000 in 1977 sanctions
would likely equate to $3,600 in 2008 standards. Id. at 67. Consumer
protection advocates address the failure to increase the amount of FDCPA
fines as an important change to be made to the statute, one that should be
adjusted periodically to keep with price increases. Id. at 66-67.
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recipient of this message." Thereafter, the collector provides the
mini-Miranda along with call-back information, hoping the
consumer will respond. 70
Although seemingly a clear way to avoid violations of the
FDCPA disclosure provisions, courts often look unfavorably upon
such tactics and have deemed the message still available for a
third party to overhear. 71 Common sense leads one to side with
these courts. Human nature being what it is, one rarely stops
listening upon hearing "if this message is not meant for you,
please stop listening." As a result, the current FDCPA provisions
are not capable of addressing the answering machine problem.
c.

Commercial Speech Argument

Perhaps the best advice for collectors would be to not leave
voice messages at all. 72 Some collectors, however, have tried to
defend their right to leave messages as commercial speech. 73 They
74
claim that imposing strict liability on all brief communications
70. See A Debtor's Rights Primer, supra note 68 at 3-4 (providing
information about the requirements of the mini-Miranda).
71. 15 U.S.C § 1692c(b) (2006).
72. But see F.T.C, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3 at 48-49
(noting that collectors should have access to technologies not addressed by the
FDCPA, including answering machines). As of now, collectors seeking to use
these devices in daily business operations are left in the technological dark
ages of calling and leaving no message to avoid FDCPA sanctions so long as
the statute remains silent. Id. at 47.
73. See Narita, supra note 40 (providing that the Koby petition includes a
commercial speech claim). See, e.g., Mark v. J.C. Christensen & Associates,
Inc., No. CIV 09-100, 2009 WL 2407700, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2009)
(showing defendant's argument that the FDCPA burdens a collector's right to
The defendant-collector argued that the FDCPA be
a communication).
subjected to a test of constitutionality on grounds that it has the effect of
creating a total ban on a medium of communication. Id. In this case, the court
applied a four-part test for determining whether a content based restriction on
commercial speech was justifiable and determined that the restriction was
constitutional. Id. at *28; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (providing the four-part test
for analyzing content restrictions on commercial speech).
74. See, e.g., Koby, 2010 WL 1438763 at *10 (demonstrating how some
courts find a brief, uninformative communication that provides only a callback number and name fails to reach the level of information to warrant
FDCPA liability). Other courts would find this information to be a
communication under the FDCPA. See, e.g., Hutton v. C.B. Accounts, Inc., No.
10-3052, 2010 WL 3021904 at *1, 3 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding, conversely
to the Koby case, that a brief message served as a communication). In Hutton,
the message was similar to that in Koby. Id. at *1. It only stated: "This
message is for Roseanne Hutton . . . this is Kyeisha . . . I need you to return

my phone call .. . 866 207 8464," but the court distinguished Koby and stated
that this was clearly an FDCPA communication. Id. at *1, *7. Hutton's
analysis demonstrates the Seventh Circuit's take on brief communications and
comports with the concern that some courts apply a level of strict liability with
all correspondence between collector and consumer, implicating the collector
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between collectors and consumers violates the "constitutional
avoidance" canon, which suggests courts should not interpret
statutes in a way that raises constitutional concerns.75 This
defense, although not commonly accepted by courts,76
demonstrates that, for collectors, such an interpretation against
the argument of commercial speech impedes the collection
.process.77
2. Conflicting Case Law Throughout District Courts
Case law demonstrates that courts have been unable to agree
as to whether a voice message constitutes an FDCPA
communication.7 8 The disparity helps demonstrate the problems
facing courts wanting to both promote the purpose of the FDCPA
and encourage the use of modern technology.79
a. Finding That a Voice Message Is a Communication Regardless
of the Message's Brevity
The most notable case addressing voice messages under the
FDCPA is Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., which held that a
voice message, regardless of the extent to which information is
provided, is always an FDCPA communication.80 In Foti,81
regardless of the actual premise of the correspondence. Narita, supra note 40.
75. See Narita, supra note 40 (demonstrating that the commercial speech
issue will be raised on appeal). This argument was already addressed in the
Koby district court decision. Koby, 2010 WL 1438763 at *17-18. The lower
court ruled that the messages were not entitled to constitutional protection
because they were misleading. Id. The Koby petition essentially argues that
the district court stopped short in its review of the constitutional issue and
should have extended the analysis to include Congressional intent. Narita,
supra note 40.
76. E.g., Berg v. Merchants Ass'n Collection Div., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d
1336, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
77. See Narita, supra note 40 (providing an example of how this strict
liability can be taken to an extreme in the debt collections process). In some
instances, a consumer may return a call and seek a transfer to the person who
handles his account. Id. If the person who transfers is a collector and fails to
provide the "mini-Miranda," the collector may be subject to an FDCPA
sanction for a mere transfer because their transfer served as part of the debt
collection process. Id. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note
3, at iii (noting that collection of valid debts is an important economic
interest).
78. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.a-b.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006) (finding that the purpose of this statute was
to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, insure that
those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and promote consistent State action to protect
consumers).
80. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
81. See id. at 647 (explaining that the defendant debt purchaser began
communications with consumer regarding two Columbia House Company
debts that cumulatively amounted to $78.75).
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defendant-collector left a uniform, pre-recorded message 2 on Foti's
answering machine that gave the collector's name, phone number,
and mentioned that this was an important business matter and
not a solicitation.83 Although defendant-collector argued that the
message was not a communication because it simply requested a
return call and did not convey any information regarding a debt, 84
the district court disagreed.85 It construed the FDCPA broadly8 6
and found that specific information about a debt need not be
conveyed because § 1692a(2) "applies to information conveyed
'directly or indirectly."'8 7 By conveying that an important matter
needed to be discussed, the court held that defendant-collector's
correspondence reached the level of an indirect communication.8 8
The Foti court's reasoning follows Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S.

Associates, Inc., a Central District of California case.8 9 There,
plaintiff-consumer incurred and subsequently failed to pay a
Capital One debt that was eventually assigned to defendantcollector.90 Analogous to the Foti case facts, defendant-collector left
multiple messages for plaintiff with a call-back name, number,
and an insistence that an important matter needed to be
discussed.91 In considering the substance of the messages, the
court found it difficult to see voice message correspondence as
anything other than a FDCPA communication because the purpose
of the voice message was to provide enough information to elicit a
response call. 92
The Foti court relied on the same logic in determining that
the defendant-collector achieved its purpose of eliciting a response
call because plaintiff subsequently called defendant-collector. 93 As

82. See id. at 648 (noting that the call was actually made through the use of
an automated dialing device).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 654.
85. Id. at 643.
86. See id. (following the approach by the Second Circuit and deeming that
the message was a communication).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2006).
88. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 655; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2006)
(providing that a communication can be the direct or indirect conveyance of
information regarding a debt).
89. See Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that although the voice messages did not convey
much information, because they referred to an important matter to discuss,
this was an indirect conveyance of debt information). The Foti court focused on
this case's holding because the facts regarding the voice messages were very
similar. 424 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
90. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
91. Id. at 1108.
92. See id. at 1116 (affirming that defendant conceded that the voice
messages are merely the first step in a process designed to communicate with
debtor-consumer regarding his debt).
93. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
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a result, the message left by defendant-collector was deemed an
FDCPA communication. A majority of courts deciding the voice
message issue have found Foti's holding persuasive just as Foti
found Hosseinzadeh persuasive. 94 These courts construe the
FDCPA statute broadly to promote its policy to protect consumers
against the abuses historically common in the debt collection
industry.9 5
b. If a Message Is Uninformative, It Does Not Rise to the Level of
a FDCPA Communication
Conversely, other courts have found that the limited
information relayed through a voice message does not rise to the
level of a FDCPA communication. For example, in Koby v. ARS
National Services, Inc.,96 the Southern District of California held
that a message that only provided the caller's name and request
for a return call did not constitute a direct or even indirect
conveyance of information regarding a debt.9 7 The court noted as
important that the collector had failed to disclose that he was
attempting to collect a debt or that any information obtained
would be used for collecting a debt.98 Because the voice message
provided nothing more than the caller's name and a call-back
number, it was not a communication as defined by the FDCPA.99
Although the majority of district courts have followed Foti,
Koby demonstrates the disparity in analysis between federal
district courts. This is evident because within five years, the
Southern District of California in Koby held differently than did
94. See generally Gryzbowski v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 618 (M.D.
Pa. 2010) (finding that a brief message where a collector did not identify self
was a communication that failed to comply with § 1692e(11)); Edwards v.
Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2008) aff'd on
other grounds, 584 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding brief communication
failed to comply with meaningful disclosure); Inman v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.,
No. 08-5866, 2009 WL 3415281 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2009) (finding collector
NCO's voice message left for consumer was a communication under the
FDCPA).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006).
96. Koby, 2010 WL 1438763. See Narita, supra note 40 (providing a look at
the arguments raised by the Koby appeal). The author of the FDCPA defense
blogs is one of the attorney's for defendant-collector ARS. Id.
97. But cf. Koby, 2010 WL 1438763 at *10 (distinguishing the claim against
the other Koby plaintiffs where the message included a reference number). For
example, collector's message to plaintiff Koby, which included the phrase,
"Please refer to your Reference Number as 15983225," was deemed by the
court to be a communication. Id. at *2, 10.
98. Id. at *16-17. Although under the Simmons claim, defendant-collector
survived analysis that would find it subject to FDCPA violation pursuant to
§ 1692e(11), the court found it had participated in communications subject to
violations with respect to the meaningful disclosure claim, § 1692d(6). Id. at
*11-17.
99. Id. at *17.
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the Central District of California when the Hosseinzedah court
considered analogous FDCPA concerns, illuminating the difficulty
that exists in simply trying to unify debt collection law within a
single state. The inability to create consistent meaning within one
state does not bode well for the debt collection industry, whose
members contact consumers across state lines.10 0 So long as
collectors work to interpret the FDCPA and consumers care to
know their rights, resolving the FDCPA communications issue
regarding voice messages is vital.
B. Social Networking Sites
Advancements in technology have come a long way since the
commercialization of the answering machine.10 1 Cell phones, caller
ID, fax machines, automated dialing systems, and the Internet
serve as examples of new technologies that the three Cs could
utilize. This next section will address the questions that arise
when debt collectors use Internet technologies in the collections
process.
1. When the Use of Social Networking Sites Is Not a
Communication
The FTC believes debt collectors should have access to new
technologies. 1 02 Most in the collection industry agree, finding that
communications technology increases efficiency in the debt
collection process.1 03 Consequently, many in the collection industry
believe the use of social networking sites to gather contact
information should not lead to FDCPA violations.10 4 They argue
100. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 14 n.101
(providing that technology has facilitated the expansion of the debt collection
industry across state lines and geographic barriers).
101. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
102. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at iii (finding
that debt collectors, through collections efforts, help keep credit available and
cost as low as possible). For information on how businesses are using social
networking sites for their benefits, see David C. Viadeck, Dir., FTC Bureau of
Consumer Prot., Promoting Consumer Privacy: Accountability and
Transparency in the Modern World (Oct. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/vladeck/091002nyu.pdf.
103. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 16-17
(pointing out that collections through technology is important since many
young consumers frequently use communications technology in daily
activities). Further, restrictions on collectors' use of communications
technology may lead to an increase in uncollected debt. Id. at 16-17.
104. See Nitzkin, supra note 44 (asserting not only that his employees use
social networking sites in the debt collection process but also that there is
nothing legally wrong with doing so). The FTC agrees to an extent,
encouraging that the debt collection industry should have the advantage of
using the same forms of technology as other businesses in the ordinary course
of business. F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3 at 36. They
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that "friending"'0 consumers merely allows collectors to gather
location information. 106
Specifically, collectors claim that contact through online social
networking sites is not a communication "in the collection of any
debt"10 7 when the collector is not explicitly seeking payment of the
collections account.108 This argument can be found in Bailey v.
Security National Servicing Corp., a case involving a mortgage

company that sent the consumer a letter regarding the current
status of his account. 09 The court found in favor of the collector for
a variety of reasons,1 0 but specifically reasoned that "only
communications 'in connection with the collection of any debt'. . .
fall under the ambit of the Act, and the defendants' letters cannot
reasonably be placed in that category.""' This case may not
directly address the issue of collection practices on social
networking sites, but it supports the collectors' argument that not
all contacts with consumers rise to the level of a communication
that invokes FDCPA sanctions.
A recent Seventh Circuit decision, Gburek v. Litton Loan
Servicing LP, distinguishes Bailey.112 In Gburek, the court found
do, however, note that more information needs to be gathered about how some
of these tools like email and social networking can be used efficiently without
violating the FDCPA. Id. at 50-51.
105. See Friending, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionar
y.com/Friending (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (defining friending: "to add
someone as a friend on a social networking site."); see, e.g., Adding friends:
How do I add a Friend?, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/help/?
page=767 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (providing instructions for how to add
friends on Facebook).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2006) (providing the manner in which debt
collectors may acquire debtor-consumer's location information).
107. Id. § 1692a(2).
108. Cf. Koby, 2010 WL 1438763 at *10 (finding that the uninformative voice
messages are not actually FDCPA communications because there is no explicit
solicitation of payment left in the voice message).
109. Bailey v. Sec. Nat. Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1998).
110. Id. The court also found that because the mortgage company was not
acting as a debt collector, it was not subject to FDCPA liabilities. Id. at 387.
Here, the court distinguished between a defaulted debt and, as is in this case,
a debt in a forbearance agreement, which was not in arrears at the time
defendants obtained the debt. Id. The court ultimately found that defendant
was not a debt collector under the definition of the FDCPA. Id. at 387-88; see
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2006) (finding that a person trying to collect an
owed debt that was not in default at the time the debt was obtained is not a
debt collector).
111. Bailey, 154 F.3d at 388.
112. See Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 384-85 (7th Cir.
2010) (finding that a communication does not have to explicitly demand a
payment to be deemed a communication between collector and consumer).
Although Bailey suggests limits on the FDCPA's reach, the case does not
establish a "categorical rule" regarding every communication between a debt
collector and a consumer. Id.
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that Bailey's holding demonstrated only one factor in an objective
test to determine whether a contact is a communication.113
Thereafter, the court held that letters sent to the consumer were
communications despite the fact that they did not explicitly solicit
payment of a debt.114
These cases demonstrate the concern with using social
networking sites to contact consumers: whether these contacts
reach the level of a communication as defined by the statute.
Because "friending" may be used to merely gather contact
information 1 5 and because "friending" does not include an explicit
payment solicitation, debt collectors contend that use of these sites
is within their rights.116 How this argument will fair in court
remains to be seen.

2. When the Use of Social Networking Sites Is a Communication
Those opposing collectors' use of new technologies fear that

their use in communications could create new methods of abusive
tactics within the industry."1 NPR addressed the concern in a
recent story on collections agencies utilizing social media sites to
gather debtor-consumer information.118 The article interviewed a
consumer who had been "found" by debt collectors after creating a
Facebook page."i9
Concerns arise when collectors go beyond simply searching
online in hopes of finding "public" contact information.120 NPR

113. Id. at 385. The court points out that other relevant factors in
considering whether a communication has been made by a debt collector with
the connection of collecting debt include the nature of the parties'
relationships as well as the purpose and context of the communications. Id.
114. Id. at 386-87.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2006).
116. See Nitzkin, supra note 46 (arguing that using Facebook in collections
efforts is legal).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006).
118. See Romo, supra note 46 (presenting the new way in which collectors
are contacting consumers to collect debts).
119. See Romo, supra note 46 (explaining that the consumer had previously
evaded collections efforts by not allowing his contact information to be made
public). The consumer contends, however, that as soon as he provided his
contact information on Facebook, pursuant to an employer request that he
network with others in his field of work, he was contacted by a collector
shortly thereafter. Id. The article does not delve into specifics regarding how
the collector gathered the consumer's information through Facebook, but it is
likely that the consumer allowed his contact information on his profile to
remain public. Id.
120. See Viadeck, supra note 102, at 7 (pointing out that consumers are often
unaware of a social networking sites privacy information). This is due to both
difficult to read privacy provisions and that many consumers choose not to
read the terms and conditions of sites they join. Id. See, e.g., Facebook Privacy
Policy: Sharing Information on Facebook, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.face
book.com/help/2page=767 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (informing users how to
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interviewed a collections attorney who stated that his employees
go so far as to "friend" consumers and contact consumers'
Facebook friends to find location information. 121 In fact, he stated
that often asset information could be gathered through contacts. 122
The attorney contends that collectors are not subject to FDCPA
liability so long as there exists a gray area in FDCPA law and
technological communications.123
As the information above suggests, whether these social
networking contacts will ultimately be determined to be
communications under the FDCPA has not yet been resolved.124
Once this determination is made, the issue of how to incorporate
the use of these sites into the debt collection industry remains to
be addressed. While awaiting resolution on the reach of the
FDCPA with respect to social networking sites, the three Cs can be
certain that this form of technological communication will serve as
a manner by which the debt collection industry will want to
operate in the future.125
As demonstrated, collectors face a predicament by using
communication technologies: they can continue to proceed through
the gray area and risk court-imposed FDCPA sanctions, or they
can cease using communication forms that are undeniably
beneficial to the industry. Until the FDCPA is updated to address
these new communication technologies, the three Cs will carry this
unnecessary burden of trying to apply the outdated FDCPA law to
situations it was not intended to cover.
IV.

PROPOSAL

In addressing technological changes that affect debt collection
laws, this Comment proposes that the CFPB add or amend
provisions to the FDCPA to address the use of new communication
technologies.126 Most industries rely on a myriad of technological
create a profile and how to control who may view the information included in
the profile). A consumer who fails to pay attention to how their contact
information is conveyed publicly on social networking sites leave collectors the
option of doing a quick Facebook search with a name to gather location
information. Roma, supra note 46.
121. Id.
122. Id. (finding out asset information as simply as through asking a
consumer's Facebook friends). For example, collectors were able to ascertain
that a consumer had an asset by simply asking the consumer's friend what the
consumer was doing. Id. The interviewed attorney replied that jet skis were
deemed as a collector's assets by using the social networking sites in this
manner. Id.
123. Id.
124. See discussions supra Part III.2.Bl-2.
125. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 36 (stating
that debt collectors "should be allowed to use all communication technologies,
including new and emerging technologies, to contact consumers.").
126. Id. With respect to the FDCPA, some, including Senator Al Franken,

2011]

The Three Cs Versus the Dinosaur

1055

communication tools in daily activities.12 7 Because debt collection
is an economically necessary industryl 28-collecting valid debts is
important because consumers who borrowed money from creditors
and who failed to repay should be held accountable for their
defaults-it should have access to the same tools as other valid
businesses. The debt collection industry should not be excluded
from technological benefits merely because the outdated FDCPA
failed to consider them.129 Specifically, provisions that address
current communication tools that have proven useful to the
industry need to be included as well as those that may prove
useful in the future.
A.

Voice Messages as an Acceptable Debt CollectionActivity

1. Voice Messages Are a Communication
The weight of case law has determined that a voice message
is, in fact, a communication.130 By deeming voice messages as
argue that the most important amendments include requiring that proper
notification be provided to consumers of their FDCPA rights through the
validation notice. End Debt Collector Abuse Act, S. 3888, 111th Cong. (2010).
Among other amendments to the FDCPA, Senator Franken wishes to include
new obligations for debt collectors in § 1692g(a) that require the initial
validation notice to include various information including the date of last
payment ("DOLP") of the debt as well as the amount of debt after the DOLP,
the description of consumer's rights with respect to cease and desists as well
as disputes, and the name and contact information for the person responsible
for handling complaints on behalf of a debt collector. Id. Senator Franken also
proposes that sanctions for FDCPA violations be increased given that the
amount of the fine has not been increased for over 30 years Id. Such a large
period of time without an increase in penalty demonstrates that FDCPA law is
in great need of revision and that the CFPB should tackle this problem as soon
as it has gained rule-making authority. This comment, however, focuses on the
need for the CFPB to target problems with communications technology. See
infra Part IV.A-B.
127. See supra notes 56 and 58 and accompanying text (providing that
businesses utilize technological communications in ordinary course of business
activities).
128. See supra note 25 and 102 and accompanying text (addressing the
importance of debt collection in the process of recovering valid debts).
129. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 36
(asserting that the FDCPA contemplated making use of all technologies
available at the time--"the mail, telephones, telegraphs, etc."-but that new
technologies was not necessarily contemplated).
130. See generally Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 643; also Hosseinzadeh, 387 F.
Supp. 2d at 1104 (holding that voice messages were "merely first step in a
process designed to communicate with plaintiff about [the] alleged debt.").
Although Koby petitioner ARS filed an appeal so the Ninth Circuit could
review the voice messages as communications issue, it was withdrawn by
petitioner ARS shortly thereafter. Koby, 2010 WL 1438763, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 2010) appeal docketed, No. 10-80158 (9th Cir., Aug. 9, 2010). Even if
an analogous case were to be brought before one of the circuit courts, the court
should deny review and instead allow the CFPB to amend the FDCPA to
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specific

2. Voice Messages Allowable Through Consumer Waiver
After determining voice messages to be communications, the
CFPB should next delineate what types of voice message
communications will be acceptable in debt collection practices. As
the wording stands, collectors face the double-edged sword with
respect to leaving voice messages: 13 1 providing too much
information leads to third-party disclosures,132 and providing too
little may result in a communication that lacks meaningful
disclosure.133
In order to eliminate these instances of liability, the CFPB
should create a new FDCPA provision requiring that collectors
only leave voice messages with prior, express permission from the
consumer. Essentially, this FDCPA provision will serve as the
consumer's waiver of certain FDCPA liabilities that could be
raised against the collector in context with leaving a message.
Through agreement, the consumer would acknowledge that any
reasonable message left by the collector is acceptable and not
subject to FDCPA sanctions through either third-party or lack of
meaningful disclosure. 134
3. Disclosuresfor Cell Phone and Landline Voice Messages
Further, the FDCPA should specify what can be left in the
message to alleviate attempts by the collectors to push the
boundaries of legality in a manner counter to the goals of the
FDCPA.135 For cell phones, the messages can be more detailed and
can provide the reason for the call. This is due to the fact that
most people have direct, private access to a cell phone voice
message unlike a voice message left on one's home answering
machine. For landline phone numbers,136 the voice messages
allowed should be limited to only the collector's name, the
consumer's reference account number, and the collector's call-back
number.
By creating these specific parameters for collectors in leaving
directly address the issue by determining that all voice messages are
communications.
131. See argument supra Part III.A.1.a-b.
132. Id. § 1692c(b).
133. Id. § 1692e(11).
134. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), e(1)-(16) (2006).
135. Id. § 1692(e).
136. Through websites such as MelissaData, creditors can determine
whether the prefix of a ten digit number (the second set of 3 digits after the
area code) is for a cellular phone or landline phone. MELISSADATA,
http://www.melissadata.com/Lookups/phonelocation.asp (last visited Aug. 1,
2011).
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permissive voice messages, it gives the consumer equal footing in
the debt collection process by allowing the consumer to control the
level of creditor contact. Further, establishing such boundaries will
create certainty within the industry, allowing collectors to better
do their jobs without the fear of crossing into the gray areas of
liability. Finally, courts will have the benefit of clear legislation to
which they can defer when disputes arise.
B. DelineatingCommunications and Non-Communications in
Debt Collector's Use of Social Networking Sites
As the FTC has stated, the debt collection industry should
have the ability to use new mediums of communication, 137 such as
social networking sites. Creating regulations for these
communication technologies may be a trickier determination to
make because the use and scope of such tools is advanced every
day.138 Nonetheless, implementing change in FDCPA law will help
update that bottom line by which the three Cs know how to
evaluate communications through new technological mediums.
1. Instances of Social Networking Non-Communications
a. The One-Contact-Only Requirement
Similar to the contacts-with-third-parties provision under
the FDCPA with regards to location information, 139 collectors
should only be allowed to contact a friend or employer of a
consumer once in attempting to locate the consumer's home and
work address and telephone numbers.140 To comply with the
FDCPA in communicating with third parties, the collectors must
hide any information that would display on their social networking

137. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 36
(providing that both the debt collection industry and the FTC believe that new
technological communications should be made available to debt collectors in
the debt collection process).
138. For example, in 2009 forty-six percent of small businesses were
interested in learning more about social networking sites' application in the
business world. Caron Beesley, Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn? Finding the
Right Fit for Your Small Business, BUSINESS.GOV (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://community2.business.gov/t5/Small-Business-Matters/Twitter-Facebookinterest
Their
or-LinkedIn-Finding-the-Right-Fit-for-Your/ba-p/31878.
demonstrates an increasing trend in businesses using social networking
technology, but also that this is still a very new tool by which many businesses
need additional resources to determine if it will prove beneficial in both
marketability and profitability. Id. Beesley provides useful resource links for
those interested in incorporating social networking into a business model. Id.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 169 2 a( 7 ) (2006) (meaning a consumer's "place of abode
and ... telephone number at such place, or ... place of employment.").
140. See generally id. § 1692b (providing grounds for contact with third
parties).
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profile that could identify them as collectors.1 41 Thereafter,
collectors should be required to de-friend4 2 a person. The use of
social networking sites in this manner would not be a
communication because collectors would utilize the medium for the
sole sake of obtaining contact information. Such practices are not
deemed communications according to the FDCPA.143
One concern with the inclusion of this provision is the
question: "Who is keeping track of collector's contacts with the
third parties?" While actively attempting to collect a debt,
collectors are encouraged to exercise good faith in adhering to a
location information provision for social networking sites just as
they are encouraged when making telephonic communications. 144
Otherwise, both consumers and third parties knowledgeable in
this particular FDCPA law can easily prove a collector's violations
through careful documentation. By producing a computer print
screen of a Facebook page that shows a collector who failed to keep
employment information private, who sent a subsequent message
to a third party, or who remained friends with a third party after
first contact, a consumer can demonstrate FDCPA violations that
make the collector liable for sanctions.
b.

The Acceptability of Gathering Public Information
Furthermore, collectors should be able to view and gather all
information from the Internet and social networking sites that
consumers leave public. In instances where collectors gather
location information and other personal details about a consumer
without having to contact a consumer or a third party, there is no
action taken that elevates the collectors' methods to that of a
communication.145 As a result, such actions should be specified as
141. Id. § 1692b(1)-(2). Two ways to avoid liability under this provision
would be for the debt collector to limit employer information on his profile by
making it unavailable to all third parties contacted for the purposes of
gathering location information. Friends: Friends List and Limited Profile Limited Profile, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=768
(last visited Aug. 1, 2011). A collector may also choose to use a "dummy"
profile although this tactic may lead to liability for false and deceptive
practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) (2006).
142. "De-friending" or "unfriending" is a term used to explain the process of
removing a person as a Facebook friend. Definition: Unfriend,
TECHTERMS.COM (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.techterms.com/definition
/unfriend. See also How to Unfriend Someone on Facebook, EHOW
(last
http://www.ehow.com/how_5021242_unfriend-someone-facebook.html
visited Aug. 1, 2011) (providing step-by-step instructions to de-friend a
Facebook friend).
143. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a (2006) (providing definition of communication);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2006) (providing additional regulations for
collector-consumer communications).
144. Id. § 1692b.
145. See supra text accompanying note 120 (explaining how consumers' lack
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acceptable methods of gaining information about a consumer.

2. Social Networking Communications and the mini-Miranda
As soon as a collector contacts the consumer, the contact
should be deemed a communication no matter how brief.
Therefore, if a debt collector contacts a consumer directly through
a social networking site, this contact 146 should be accompanied by
a message to the consumer explaining the purpose of the
communication. 147 After the collector provides the mini-Miranda,
the consumer has the control to lay the groundwork for acceptable
methods of subsequent communications. Conversely, if the
consumer does not want to continue communications, he may
choose not to do so. 148
Essentially, this disclosure and procedure for subsequent
communications will be analogous to the mini-Miranda and
disclosure requirement for telephonic communications, putting
social networking sites on the same footing as phone calls where a
consumer who so chooses may continue or cease communications.
By extending the mini-Miranda provisions in the FDCPA to
include these social networking contacts, the CFPB simplifies the
law for the three Cs so that they know both old and new
technological communications require the same disclosures by
collectors.

C. Future Technologies Consideration
Finally, the CFPB should provide a general provision to the
FDCPA that considers the use of future communication
technologies not yet contemplated in the debt collection industry.
of knowledge regarding privacy settings for social networking sites may leave
them vulnerable to debt collectors utilizing the sites to gather location
information).
146. An example of this type of contact through Facebook is the manner by
which one person submits a friend request to another person. See supra note
105 and accompanying text.
147. See Messages and Inbox: Sending a message - How do I Send a Message,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=1220 1&refquery=send
FACEBOOK.CoM,
ing+messages+to+non (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (providing step-by-step
approach to messaging Facebook friends and non-friends). If the consumer has
de-activated the "send message" option on his profile, the collector must
contact the consumer using alternate communications methods. Message and
Inbox: Privacy - How Can I Control Who Can Send Me Messages,
FACEBOOK.coM, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=940 (last visited Aug. 1,
2011).
148. There is, however, no help for those who keep their information public
or who choose to blindly accept friend requests without reading the
accompanying message. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1a-b. Although
collectors may not continue to contact consumers via social networking sites
without express permission, they may utilize any location information found to
pursue collections communication telephonically.
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Because the CFPB will have rule-making authority, it will be able
to readily address new forms of technological communications as
they arise. 149 Nonetheless, if future legislation shifts authority
regarding the FDCPA away from the CFPB or at a minimum
eliminates the CFPB's rule-making capabilities,150 such a blanket
provision regarding future technologies in the FDCPA would
eliminate a repeat of the problem that the FTC has faced in
dealing with a consumer financial protection statute that was not
forward thinking.15 1 Further, providing a blanket provision for
future technologies will ultimately demonstrate the FDCPA's
acceptance that new technologies will be utilized in the future of
the debt collection industry.
V.

CONCLUSION

Now that the CFPB has taken control of all consumer
protection statutes, it will have the opportunity to update and
clarify the archaic FDCPA for the benefit of the three Cs. The
CFPB will resolve both the voice message and social networking
contact issue by determining that contacts through any medium by
collectors to consumers are communications when the ultimate
goal is to encourage future discussions of the consumer's debt.
Next, the CFPB will provide clarity on both collectors' and
consumers' rights to any court faced with a FDCPA
communications dispute by specifying how collectors may
communicate with consumers subsequent to determining that a
contact is a communication. Ultimately, by including these new
communications guidelines in FDCPA law, the CFPB will provide
the three Cs the clarity it needs to know, follow, and enforce this
debt collection law in a technologically evolving society.

149. Pub. L. No. 111-203, Tit. X, § 1011-18, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see supra
text accompanying note 20 (providing summary of CFPB rule-making
authority).
150. Since Dodd-Frank has shifted authority over the FDCPA from the FTC
to the CFPB, we cannot simply assume that another transfer will not happen
in the future nor can we assume that the CFPB rule-making authority over
the FDCPA will remain absolute. See, e.g., Phyllis Salowe-Kaye, Republicans
Seek to Handcuff Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, NJ.COM (July 28,
http://blog.nj.com/njv-guest blog/2011/07/republicans_
2011,
7:06 AM),
seek to handcuff c.html (discussing Republican's staunch opposition to the
power currently held by the CFPB that has led to their assertion that "they
would not confirm any [CFPB director] nominee unless the bureau's powers
[was] gutted.").
151. See F.T.C., COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS, supra note 3, at 36, 50-51
(noting that the FDCPA does not provide any information regarding future
communications, so the FTC was in a difficult position in determining how
communication technologies could be implemented into the debt collection
law).

